September 2007 Team of Rivals – audio recording
Here’s the audio recording for the Team of Rivals September call. Listen online ordownload the mp3 file and listen to it as a podcast on your ipod.
Thucydides Book 4.1- 5.26 Questions
Please look over these comments and questions for our discussion next week. I hope you are enjoying Book 4 as much as I am!
Andre
Thucydides Book 4.1– 5.26
Three main efforts, a pivotally symbolic triptych
1. Pylos –
Comment: The narration of this event is a marked change of Thucydides’ style compared to previously related campaigns. W. Robert Connor in his assessment Thucydides (Princeton UP, 1985) writes: “Paradox has an important role in the account, and a fully appropriate one. The Pylos operation marks a major turning point in the Histories. It is the first sign of the grand reversal in which the war culminates – the Athenians, at the outset Greece’s major naval power, ultimately lose their fleet; the Spartans, traditionally a land power, acquire an empire and develop the navy to control it. Pylos is our first glimpse of the larger pattern” (Connor, 111).
Questions: What do you think of Connor’s assessment?
The description of the Pylos campaign takes up a good portion of the first half of Book 4. Why has Thucydides focused more on the telling of the battle and not as much on the negotiations and politics around the battle?
Why do the “rational” Athenians reject an offer of peace from the Spartans?
Why do the “belligerent” Spartans offer such rational peace terms?
2. Hermocrates’ speech at Gela – an attempt at unifying ‘Sicilians’ against the influence of the Athenians.
Comment: Hermocrates’ logic is a recognition that aggressive “preventative measures” are the best form of defense in the RealPolitik world of the Greek Mediterranean. W. R. Connor argues that this speech may hearken back to Thucydides’ earlier statement on the cause of the Peloponnesian War in the first place. Thucydides’ original words are: “The truest reason, although the least evident in the discussion, was, in my opinion, that the Athenians by growing great caused fear in the Lacedaemonians and drove them into war” (1.23.6). This may be the repetition of a key theme for Thucydides about the ‘balance of power’ situation in the Mediterranean.
Questions: Once again, as with the Spartan delegation to Athens earlier in Book 4, Hermocrates’ speech is not balanced with an “antilogy” or counterpart speech as we saw Thucydides do earlier in Books 1-3. Why do you suppose Thucydides does this?
Is he commenting on the lack of debate among people & governments? Is it a comment on the state of war at this time?
Have the ‘courtesies of war’ slowly been dispensed with after so many years of destruction?
3. Brasidas’ operations in Northern Greece –
Comment: Sparta sends out a military commander with some diplomatic skills. The interesting characteristics of Brasidas are not only his ability to combine military effectiveness with politics in the Northern Greek regions, but his ability to promote the mantra of Sparta’s willingness to ‘liberate Greeks from Athenian imperialism.’ In addition, examples of Brasidas’ clemency show a ‘kinder, gentler’ version of one’s typical image of a Spartan, which helps to promote Sparta’s image. Meanwhile, “liberated city-states” continue to install pro-Spartan oligarchies in various cities won over by Brasidas’ charisma. The contrast between Brasidas and Cleon from earlier in Book 4 is inevitable: Cleon the politician-turned-commander meets Brasidas the commander-turned-diplomat at Amphipolis. Both are killed as a result of the battle, but both have made their mark on the war. Neither of them was favorable towards a peace settlement, but with both out of the way, Book 5 opens with a temporary peace that, alas, will not last. The pawns in their game, the city-states of the North, find themselves desperate to ally with a winner who can end this war. Unfortunately, the war’s changing fortunes only lead to reprisals from Athens and more bloodshed.
Questions: What about the ideal of Greek city-state independence? Can it ever exist again? Did it really ever exist prior to this?
Which side, Sparta or Athens, are the real “liberators” (if any)?
What part did Thucydides himself play in the battle of Amphipolis? Why did he suffer banishment as a result? Could these personal reversals affect his telling of the History? Why does Thucydides focus so much on the personalities of Cleon and Brasidas? Does this method adequately signify larger political and social trends for each of the superpowers? Does this method forecast events for the rest of the war and the post-bellum period for Greece?
Book 3 Thucydides – audio recording
Here’s the audio recording for the Thucydides September 2007 book3 call. Listen online or download the mp3 file and listen to it as a podcast on your ipod.
Last thoughts on Kings
Hi folks–
I’m just finishing up 2 Kings, and having a couple thoughts to follow up on the call.
The first is that this tale of decline and eventual conquest of Israel seems eerily similar to the pattern of decline and weakening of the Roman Empire (I’ll probably revise this opinion when we read more about Rome): The rulers become ever more capricious and devoid of principle, the reigns become ever shorter and more marked by madness and excess, and the palace intrigues become ever bloodier as the kingship becomes a prize to be grabbed by force, purely for personal gain. Though David and Solomon look awfully compromised by our moral standards, they do look heroic by comparison with Ahab and Jezebel and their successors. The multiple slaughter of whole families brings to mind again Shakespeare’s MacBeth, his slaughter of MacDuff’s family, and the disintegration of MacBeth’s kingdom, concurrent with the disintegration of his mind. Shakespeare (or whoever wrote those plays–you may have seen the revived controversy) no doubt studied Kings as well as Samuel.
My second thought returns to Nancy’s point. After multiple appearances by The Lord, and crystal-clear enunciation of His commandments: Why didn’t the Israelites learn? It’s a great question that goes to the heart of the human condition: why do we keep doing evil? (I’m leaving aside the sense in Kings that evil constituted mostly worshiping Baal, and that slaughter in the name of the Lord was apparently a good thing.) There’s a tie-in with the earlier Biblical books, specifically Genesis. I’m reading a book that speaks to this, Donald Miller’s “Blue Like Jazz: Nonreligious Thoughts on Christian Spirituality.” Miller’s a Christian who uses startling language and outside-the-box imagery–it’s enjoyable reading, though he makes leaps I can’t always track. He makes a compelling case (unfortunately!) for the concept of original sin, put in ordinary practical terms: it’s just easier for people to do bad than to do good. Doing good requires effort, help and support. (In Miller’s case, he’s talking about divine help and support–grace.)
I think Nancy’s question is a fundamental one for us to keep in sight, as we go through the Bible and beyond. I’d add a few corollary ones: What do people need in order to do good? What conditions do we need? Can we make moral progress and become better people, individually and collectively?
End of thoughts.
Pat
September 2007 Old Testament – Kings 1 & 2 – audio recording
Here’s the audio recording for the Old Testament August call. Listenonline or download the mp3 file and listen to it as a podcast on youripod.
Vulcanalia, Mt. Vesuvius and my birthday
Folks,
It’s my birthday today – Thursday, August 23 – the day the Romans celebrated “Vulcanalia” and the day before Mt. Vesuvius erupted August 24 AD 79.
– August 23 – Vulcanalia
http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/secondary/SMIGRA*/Vulcanalia.html
– August 24 – Mt. Vesuvius erupted
http://ancienthistory.about.com/od/italialatiumitaly/g/Vesuvius.htm?nl=1
Hope you are enjoying the final days of summer – and getting caught up on the next chapters in Thucydides (for reading group 2) and the Old Testament (for reading group 1).
Reading with you is a great gift!
Phil
Thucydides Book 3 Questions
Hi folks, I really enjoyed getting the chance to meet some of you (in person) at the MET last week. I am still coming down from our discussions and the exhibits, especially the Roman sculptures (the Caligula bust is in such good condition) and Roman murals (very vivid colors, more than I expected). Here are our next set of discussion questions for Book 3. I hope that the minimal notes will also help us keep the larger perspective of Thucydides’ direction in mind. Reading Book 3 may seem like more of Book 2 at first, but I have found that Thucydides tries different ways of narrating his history in each book. See if you can detect any subtle differences in presentation as you read through Book 3. The differences will become much more clear from Book 4 on. Sincerely, Andre
Summary of events so far: Book 1 – events concerning primarily Athens & Sparta that lead up to the war
Book 2 – first three years progress of the war; at the beginning of Book 2, the Plataean occupation by Thebes starts the Peloponnesian war. By the third year, instead of the usual invasion and devastation of Attica, Sparta and the Peloponnesian League besieges Plataea and pressures it to renounce its association with Athens.
Book 3 – years four, five and six of the war; the opening of this book (fourth year of the war) concentrates first on the revolt of the island of Lesbos (except Methymna) from Athens.
1. What conditions lead to this revolt? Why do the Mytilenians especially feel that this is the proper moment to challenge Athens? What are the strategic ramifications for a successful revolt versus an unsuccessful one?
In the summer of the fifth year, the Athenians debate the fate of Mytilene. 2. Cleon’s speech (3.37-3.40) imposes a hard line toward the Mytilenians in the name of Imperial rule. How are his words an indictment of the rule of Athenian democracy in determining foreign policy? Cleon is reported to have said: “I therefore now as before persist against your reversing your first decision, or giving way to the three failings most fatal to empire – pity, sentiment, and indulgence” (3.40, p. 178). Are “pity, sentiment, and indulgence” truly out of place in foreign policy decisions? domestic policy decisions? (Diodotus responds to “pity” and “indulgence” as well in 3.48)
3. How does Diodotus’ point of view present democracy in terms of foreign policy? Is he simply advocating a “dove” approach in response to Cleon’s “hawkish” approach? What part does social class play in Diodotus’ proposal? How ethical is it? How political? How does the result of the Mytilenian debate reflect the democratic process in Athens? How does the result speak to the rest of the Athenian allies?
By winter of the fourth year, the ensuing Plataean siege still leaves some important questions: 4. Why are the Spartans so intent on subjugating Plataea? Is the goal a military one? political? psychological? Why are the Athenians not sending more significant relief to the besieged Plataeans? Why are the Plataeans still remaining loyal to Athens? Why does Thucydides spend effort on describing the events of this particular siege (specifically 3.20-24, 3.52)?
In the fifth year of the war, the Plataeans (3.53-59) and Thebans (3.60-67) debate their own respective merits in the Greek world at this time: 5. Which argument is more persuasive to you? Is either argument much more forceful than the other? What reasons do the Plataeans have for standing with Athens? How are these reasons either stated or implied? How do the Thebans respond to the Plataean argument with any conviction? How does Sparta’s punishment of Plataea compare with Athens’ punishment of Lesbos?
The effect of the Peloponnesian war upon Corcyra in the summer of the fifth year. 6. How does the Corcyrean revolution (3.69-85) complement what Thucydides initially brought up concerning the Mytilenean revolt? Is Thucydides maintaining “historical objectivity” or is he allowing too much subjective comment here? What is the significance of Corcyra with respect to any of the other many city- states that Athens has an interest in? to all of Greece? What is Thucydides implying with respect to the relationship between war and revolution? Does this bear out in later history?
7. Is the weather phenomena described in 3.89 a “tsunami”?!
8. As for military operations in Northern Greece, what is Thucydides trying to say by focusing on Demosthenes’ defeat and victory? How do the Athenian allies participate? Is Sparta’s military strategy here effective? Why or why not?
Mentions of Sicilian operations are scattered throughout the book and will become more important in Book 4 as a reason the Athenians land at Pylos. In books 6 & 7, the ill-fated Athenian Expedition to Sicily will eventually affect the outcome of the whole Peloponnesian war.
August 2007 Old Testament – Samuel 1 & 2 – audio recording
Here’s the audio recording for the Old Testament August call. Listen online or download the mp3 file and listen to it as a podcast on your ipod.
Roam 2: Photos and thanks
Folks,
We had another great annual meeting of the reading odyssey readers at the Metropolitan Museum of Art last Friday August 10, 2007.
Here’s a link to the photos, graciously provided by Laurea.
Chad Houghton in RO2 said:
Thanks for a fantastic experience on Friday afternoon. I thoroughly enjoyed the entire afternoon/evening, and it has inspired me to catch up to the group with my reading.
Thank *you*, Chad and thank you to everyone who attended.
I am grateful to Pat and Andre – my co-hosts – and to all of you who are creating this lifelong odyssey with me.
Best,
Phil
History as guide to policy? Your thoughts?
Reading group colleagues,
I have several questions for you to ponder and respond back to.
The New York Times “Week in Review” had an interesting article by David Kirkpatrick yesterday, Sunday August 26, 2007, in which Kirkpatrick briefly explored the idea of whether history is a reliable guide to policy and decision-making.
The article is a response to President Bush’s statement last week – supporting his policy to remain in Iraq – that the pullout from Vietnam led to the atrocities of the Khmer Rouge.
Kirkpatrick then raises an interesting question – about the role of history.
In the article, Kirkpatrick also quotes two professors who say that perhaps the Vietnam War would have not happened had policy-makers considered Thucydides and his description of the failed campaign against Syracuse (note: for those of you just now reading Thucydides, this famous campaign happens later in the war – we aren’t there yet).
Read the article and then consider these questions:
– For those of you who have read Thucydides, do you think that Johnson Administration officials knowledge of and understanding into the “ill-conceived Athenian invasion of Syracuse” could actually have changed Vietnam War policy?
– Kirkpatrick argues (or quotes those who do) that President Kennedy succeeded in the Cuban Missile Crisis by *not* relying on historical precedent to guide his decision-making. Does his argument make sense? Is Kennedy a good counter-example to Bush?
– Can the knowledge of past historical decisions guide us in current decision-making? Does historical analogy work like Bush and the professors suggest? Or, is Kirkpatrick right to raise the question about how policy-makers and historians use history? Should we use history more as a way to help inform the development of our thinking – instead of a way to justify the results of our thinking?
– For those of you reading “Team of Rivals” (or with knowledge of Lincoln), did Lincoln rely on precedent to justify his Civil War policy – or on his own developed thinking and values (certainly informed by historical knowledge)? Note: yes, Lincoln, of course, was known for his collaborative thinking – but he did reserve certain fundamental decisions – especially the decision to go to war and the conditions for peace – to himself.
Thoughts? Comments? Let’s see if we can get an online dialogue going across the reading groups about the role of history in policy making – and, more broadly, what lessons we can justifiably learn from history.
Thanks,
Phil
P.S. Perhaps Thucydides himself – who ends the book mid-sentence in the middle of chapter 8 – may be giving us his answer with his abrupt ending: that due to the complexity of human behavior and interaction, history cannot tell us what to do – it’s not even clear that we can ever understand all the motivations and actions taken – but, by example, history can certainly inform us about that very complexity and caution us against certain common failures of human nature.
27. August 2007 by Arrian
Categories: Thucydides | Tags: Commentary, General Comments | 1 comment